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NOTES
Ad Valorem Taxation-Procedural Developments in the Discovery of
Unlisted Property
Although all North Carolina property owners are required to list
their property for ad valorem taxation each year' and substantial crimi-
nal2 and civil penalties3 are imposed for failure to do so, taxpayers fail
to list assets worth millions of dollars each year.4 To hold property to
its fair share of the tax burden, the Machinery Act of North Carolina5
provides for the listing, assessment, and imposition of penalties on prop-
erty that the owner fails to list. The discdvery statute' places an affirma-
tive duty on tax officials to discover property, to list it, to appraise and
assess it, and to take the action necessary to prevent failures to list.7
In separate decisions filed the same day s the North Carolina Su-
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-285(a) (1972).
21d. § 105-308 (1972) provides:
In addition to all other penalties prescribed by law, any person whose duty it is to
list any property who willfully fails or refuses to list the same within the time prescribed
by law shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed five hundred
dollars ($500.00) or imprisonment not to exceed six months. The failure to list shall be
prima facie evidence that the failure was willful.
Any person who removes or conceals property for the purpose of evading taxation
or who aids or abets the removal or concealment of property for the purpose of evading
taxation shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed five hundred
dollars ($500.00) or imprisonment not to exceed six months.
3See note 15 and accompanying text infra.
'The response of 55 North Carolina counties to an informal survey made in 1971 revealed
that the appraised evaluation of unlisted property discovered by them during 1970 was
$201,927,855. The surveyor cautioned that he figure should not be relied on because it was unrea-
sonable to believe that all the counties which responded understood the request and responded in
the same way. However, he noted, "the pattern disclosed is plain." H. LEwis, DISCOVERED PROP-
ERTY: AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF TAX REVENUE, (Institute of Government, Property Tax Bulletin
No. 36, 1972).
'N.C. GEN. STATS. §§ 105-271 to -395 (1972) (enacted as Ch. 806, [1971] N.C. Sess. L._.._,
as amended Ch. 931, [1971] N.C. Sess. L. -C...; h. 932, [1971] N.C. Sess. L. Ch. 1121,
[1971] N.C. Sess. L. C.......- h  1162, [1971] N.C. Sess. L. .._). This note is limited to a narrow
topic within the total statutory scheme. A full understanding of the ad valorem tax structure
requires a recognition that the Machinery Act is an integrated body of statutes creating a tax cycle
completed each year without overlap, providing for the annual revenue requirements of local
government. For an excellent outline of the ad valorem tax structure, see H. LEwis, THE PROPERTY
TAX, AN INTRODUCTION (The Institute of Government, University of North Carolina, 1972).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-312 (1972).
71d. § 105-312(b) (1972).
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preme Court reviewed two discovery proceedings by county tax officials
made under the statute.' In re Strong Tire Service, Inc."0 held that the
difference between the reported and actual values of a taxpayer's inven-
tories constituted discovered property. In re McLean Trucking Co."
focused on the procedural elements of a discovery, holding that a discov-
ery is made when tax officials become fully aware of facts sufficient to
require the property to be listed. It further held that tax officials lost
their authority to list and tax discovered property in a particular year
when they were fully aware of facts to justify listing the property before
the county board of equalization and review had adjourned but waited
until that body had adjourned before initiating discovery proceedings.
The broadening of tax officials' duty to discover property under
Strong and the limitations on the tax officials' discovery power imposed
by McLean will require ad valorem tax administrators to review their
practices. The purpose of this note is to examine the reasoning of the
court in McLean and to determine the impact of the decision on the
administration of ad valorem tax in North Carolina in light of Strong.
The statute establishes the procedure a local government unit must
follow to effect a discovery.' Typically, discovered property is listed
under the direction of the tax supervisor who, if possible, may make a
tentative appraisal. 3 A rebuttable statutory presumption arises that in
addition to the current year, the property should have been listed by the
taxpayer for the preceding five years.14 The property is taxed and sub-
stantial penalties are imposed for each of the years in which the owner
failed to list. 5 Both listing and appraisal are subject to approval by the
county board of equalization and review and if that body has adjourned
for the year, by the board of 'County commissioners. 6
'Ch. 806, § 1109, [1939] N.C. Sess. L. 367, as amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-312 (1972).
10281 N.C. 293, 188 S.E.2d 306 (1972).
"281 N.C. 242, 188 S.E.2d 452 (1972).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-312(d) (1972). For purposes of this note, the discussion of discovery
will be limited to personal property. The discovery of real property so far as it differs from personal
property is provided for in subsection (c).
'31d. § 105-312(d) (1972).
14Id. § 105-312(0 (1972).
"ISd. § 105-312(g)-(h) (1972). For the present year, the penalty is 10% of the amount of the
tax. For the prior year, the penalty is 20%. For the year five years prior to the present year it
becomes 60%. The entire bill is considered due for the present year. Id. § 105-312(i) (1972). If
payment is late, interest is charged. Id. § 105-360 (1972).
15d. § 105-312(d) (1972). The county commissioners constitute the membership of the county




The board of equalization and review meets during each tax year
for a period which must begin between the first Monday in April and
the first Monday in May. It is supposed to complete its duties within
three weeks; however, it may extend its term as required to perform its
duties but never later than July 1.17
The board of equalization and review must review the listings and
valuations assigned by the list takers and the tax supervisor, exercise its
authority to change the listings and valuations, and make corrections
to comply with the provisions of the Machinery Act. In addition, the
board has authority to make discoveries and to hear taxpayers who
appeal the listings and valuations determined by the list takers and the
tax supervisor."8 Prior to its adjournmerit, the board certifies and fixes
the tax rolls, thereby establishing the identity and value of property
taxable for that year,19 subject only to limited changes by the board of
county commissioners, one of which is the addition of discovered prop-
erty to the rolls.
20
Cities and towns as taxing units also have power to discover and
list,21 but they must accept county appraisals.22 Nevertheless, a city or
town can appraise discovered property if the county fails to do So.
2
1
The discovery statute enacted by the 1971 General Assembly24 rep-
resents a substantial revision of the comparable provision in the Machi-
nery Act of 1939.25 A commission created by the 1969 General Assem-
bly to recommend changes to the Machinery Act2 1 reported that it
intended not to change the statute substantively but to redraft it in the
interest of clarity. The commission noted a feeling among local tax
officials and the State Board of Assessment that the discovery statute
should expressly apply to property returned with an understatement in
value, number, and amount. Although tax officials felt that the pre-
1"1d. § 105-322(e) (1972).
18Id. § 105-322(g) (1972).
"Id. § 105-323 (1972).
201d. § 105-325(a)(5) (1972).
21d. § 105-312(o (1972).
'22d. § 105-327 (1972). A city, however, may establish its own valuations if located in more
than one county. Id. § 105-328 (1972).
-1d. § 105-312(o (1972).
2"See note 5 supra.
-Ch. 310, [1939] N.C. Sess. L. 600.
"1The Commission for the Study of the Local and Ad Valorem Tax Structure of the State of
North Carolina. Res. 92, [1969] N.C. Sess. L. 1600.
"REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF LOCAL AND AD VALOREM TAX STRUCTURE
OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 300-02 (1970).
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1971 statute tacitly applied to such property, the 1971 version expressly
included substantially understated property within the definition of dis-
covered property.
Although the former discovery statute was enacted more than
thirty years ago, Strong was the first case raising the issue of whether
it applied to understated property. In Strong the taxpayer listed its
business inventories for ad valorem taxation on business abstract forms
provided by the county. A portion of the form called for the listing of
"inventories" by total value rather than by itemization. The abstract
was completed and signed by the taxpayer's agent who swore that the
listing was a "full, true and complete list" 8 of the property the taxpayer
owned. After investigating the taxpayer's business records and state tax
returns, the county tax supervisor determined that the taxpayer had
significantly under-reported the value of its inventories from 1963
through 1968.9 The tax supervisor treated the difference between the
value of the inventories on the taxpayer's books and the reported value
for each year as discovered property. After giving Strong opportunity
to appear, the board of county commissioners approved the action and
imposed taxes and penalties."
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court sustained the posi-
tion of the county commissioners, holding that "[w]hen inventories are
identified and listed only by value, gross understatement of value is
evidence that all of the taxpayer's inventories were not listed."', The
court found that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that the
taxpayer had not listed a portion of its inventories and that the board
of county commissioners properly applied the statute. The court re-
jected the argument of the taxpayer (accepted by the superior court) that
the taxpayer had listed its inventories even though understated in value
and that once property is listed, it cannot be deemed discovered prop-
erty.32 The taxpayer had argued that the change in its listing was an
attempt to revalue the property after its valuation had been fixed for
that year by the board of equalization and review.3 3 The court distin-
1281 N.C. at 295, 188 S.E.2d at 308.
"The percentages of the taxpayer's actual inventories reported to the county was [sic] 45.87%
for 1963; 41.26% for 1964; 35.32% for 1965; 31.71% for 1966; 27.13% for 1967; and 21.12% for
1968." Id. at 295, 188 S.E.2d at 308.
rhe board of equalization and review had adjourned, and the board of county commission-
ers acted under Ch. 310, § 1108, [1939] N.C. SEss. L. 637, as amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-
325 (1972).
31281 N.C. at 299, 188 S.E.2d at 310 (emphasis by the Court).
32ld.
13 d. at 299, 188 S.E.2d at 309.
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guished Spiers v. Davenport34 and Wolfenden v. Board of County
Commissioners,35 both urged by the taxpayer. In those cases, the court
had reversed actions by the board of county commissioners increasing
the valuation of property after the board of equalization and review had
adjourned and the taxpayer had paid his taxes. The Strong court distin-
guished the cases on the ground that Spiers and Wolfenden involved
"specific listed property,"3 that is, property identified by item, while
the taxpayer in Strong listed his property "in bulk,' 37 indicating that
the court found that the question of listing had not been raised in either
case. In both these cases, the taxpayer specifically listed the property
by item; thus, both were obvious attempts to reassess listed and pre-
viously appraised property. In Strong, the issue was whether the tax-
payer's property had been listed at all.
This interpretation of the former discovery statute was eagerly
awaited by tax authorities. Although there had been no judicial determi-
nation of the question, two opinions of the Attorney General38 had
expressed the view that the pre-1971 statute did not encompass under-
valued property. Under Strong the discovery statutes reach inventories
reported at a substantial understatement of value. This development
emphasized the responsibility of tax officials to seek understated prop-
erty and will necessitate extensive inquiry into business listings and
determination of valuation problems.
In McLean the taxpayer was an interstate common carrier of
freight, incorporated in North Carolina, with one of its sixty-six termin-
als located in Winston-Salem, the site of McLean's principal office in
the state. In 1969 McLean listed in Winston Township, Forsyth County,
all the tractors and trailers that were assigned to the company's
Winston-Salem terminal (Winston Township is coterminous with the
corporate limits of Winston-Salem). It also listed in Btoadbay Town-
ship, Forsyth County, certain tractors and trailers not assigned to the
Winston-Salem terminal which operated on an unassigned basis
throughout the McLean system.39 Prior to April 22, 1969, the Forsyth
34263 N.C. 56, 138 S.E.2d 762 (1964).
-152 N.C. 83, 67 S.E. 319 (1910).
3281 N.C. at 297, 188 S.E.2d at 309.
'id. at 298, 188 S.E.2d at 309.
"Letter from Harry McMullen, Attorney General of North Carolina, to Thomas C. Hoyle,
December 22, 1950; 40 Op. N.C. Arr'Y GEN. 775 (1969).
"McLean's unassigned fleet of tractors and trailers listed in Broadbay Township included
tractors and trailers which were operated in North Carolina as well as other states. The listing did
not include "Group II" tractors which did not operate in North Carolina except in rare cases. The
1973]
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county tax supervisor" questioned whether the tax situs of these unas-
signed vehicles lay in Broadbay Township, where McLean maintained
a storage lot for the vehicles and where the property had been listed in
previous years,41 or in Winston Township, where the company's princi-
pal office was located.42 Decision of this issue would determine whether
the vehicles would be subject to city taxes as well as county taxes. The
attorneys for Forsyth County and the City of Winston-Salem obtained
information from the taxpayer's counsel concerning the use and prior
history of the lot and made visits to the lot. After the county board of
equalization and review had adjourned and the taxpayer had paid his
county taxes on the unassigned vehicles, the county and city attorneys
advised the tax supervisor that in their opinion the tax situs of the
unassigned vehicles was Winston Township and Winston-Salem. After
notifying the taxpayer, the county tax supervisor listed the unassigned
vehicles in Winston Township and Winston-Salem as discovered prop-
erty, and the board of county commissioners approved his action."2
valuation of the vehicles was $4,318,560. 281 N.C. at 244-45, 188 S.E.2d at 453-54.
10The city of Winston-Salem had elected to use the listings of property determined by the
county rather than establish its own listing system. Ch. 310, § 1201, [1939] N.C. Sess. L. 641, as
amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-326(a) (1972). Therefore, the county tax supervisor was responsi-
ble for the proper listing of property both for the county and the city.
"In 1950, in response to an inquiry from McLean's attorney, the former county attorney
expressed the opinion that the tax situs of the vehicles was in Broadbay Township, an opinion that,
under the statute's requirement that personal property be relisted each year, was necessarily subject
to an annual reevaluation. Nevertheless, that opinion was relied upon by all parties for nineteen
years, that is until September 8, 1969, when the county attorney wrote McLean's attorney that
"since the date of the former opinion, the facts regarding this situation are slightly different, and
the interpretations of the law have been clarified somewhat." 281 N.C. at 248, 188 S.E.2d at 455-
56.
12Ch. 310, § 800, [1939] N.C. Sess. L. 621, as amended, Ch. 836 [1947] N.C. Sess. L. 1142;
Ch. 1102, [1951) N.C. Sess. L. 1134; Ch. 1012, §§ 2,3, [1955] N.C. Sess. L. 987-88; CH. 940,
[1969] N.C. SEss. L. 1086 (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-302 (1965)) provided:
(a) [A]II tangible personal property . . . shall be listed in the township in which the
owner thereof has his residence . . . . The residence of a corporation, partnership or
unincorporated association, domestic or foreign, shall be the place of its principal office
in this State...
(d) [Tiangible personal property shall be listed in the township in which such property
is situated, rather than in the township in which the owner resides, if the owner or person
having control thereof hires or occupies a . . . place for storage ...
-Ch. 310, § 1108, [1939] N.C. Sess. L. 637, as amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-325 (1972)
provided in part:
After the Board of Equalization has finished its work and the changes effected by it have
been given effect on the tax records, the Board of County Commissioners may not
authorize any changes to be made on said records except as follows:
(5) To add any discovered property under the provisions of this Act.
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McLean appealed to the State Board of Assessment, which affirmed the
action of the county commissioners. McLean then petitioned for judicial
review, and the superior court of Forsyth County affirmed the findings
of the State Board of Assessment.
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed. Accepting the ad-
ministrative decision that the proper tax situs of the vehicles was Win-
ston Township,44 the court nevertheless held that the county commis-
sioners' jurisdiction to add discovered property to the tax records ap-
plied only to property discovered after the board of equalization and
review had adjourned for that year. Terming the natural and ordinary
meaning of "discovered" to be "newly found and not previously
known"45 and reading the record to indicate that the tax officials of the
city and the county were fully aware of the facts governing the tax situs
before adjournment of the county board of equalization and review,"
the court held that the discovery could not be deemed to have taken
place after that board had adjourned, and thus the listing was void.47
For purposes of analysis, a property tax discovery under the statute
may be divided into two distinct elements: factual inquiry and legal
determinations. When tax officials, while performing their duty to look
out for unlisted property, suspect that certain property has not been
listed, they inquire into facts necessary to determine whether the prop-
erty is in fact listed," whether it is taxable,49 and whether it has a situs
"Relying on In re Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 263 N.C. 345, 139 S.E.2d 633 (1965), that
"situated" means more or less permanently located, the court concluded the vehicles were not
"situated" on the lot because, "fa]s of 1 January 1969, and for many months prior thereto, none
of these vehicles was stored upon this lot or elsewhere in Broadbay Township ... " 281 N.C. at
250, 188 S.E.2d at 457.
For a discussion of intrastate situs problems of personal property, see H. LEwis, INTRASTATE
TAX SITUS OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY (The Institute of Government, University of North
Carolina, 1963).
"1281 N.C. at 252, 188 S.E.2d at 458.
"The court also concluded that the former discovery statute also limited the power of the city
as well as the board of county commissioners to list the discovered property after the board of
equalization and review had adjourned. Id.
"The taxpayer had also contested the assessment of the vehicles at 100% of their value. The
taxpayer argued that since they were engaged in interstate commerce, their tax value should be
apportioned among the states in which the vehicles operated, contending that an assessment at
100% of the value was a violation of the commerce clause. However, since the taxpayer had not
contested the county assessment based on 100% of the vehicles' value and since the city listing was
void, the question was not reached in this case. The issue was raised when the taxpayer listed its
unassigned vehicles in the city for 1970 taxes, and the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the
assessment at 100% valuation but remanded the case because the valuation of the vehicles was
defectively formulated. In re McLean Trucking Co. 281 N.C. 375, 189 S.E.2d 194 (1972).
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-312(a)(2) (1972).
"Id. §§ 105-274 to -281 (1972).
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within the jurisdiction of the taxing unit." In addition, they must also
determine the legal consequences of these facts under the appropriate
statutes and constitutional provisions. Since tax officials often deter-
mine the legal consequences of facts as they are collected, the two
elements are not always seen as separate. However, if a complex legal
question is presented, it is possible for tax officials to know all the
relevant facts before they or the taxing unit's attorney can determine
their legal consequences, thus producing a distinct two-step process.
Once satisfied that they have made a discovery, the statute requires
that tax officials list the discovered property in the taxpayer's name and
send him notice of this right to a hearing,' an act which does not take
place until both the necessary factual and legal conclusions have been
reached. By requiring tax officials to take this action, the statute itself
provides precise evidence of when a discovery is made. In contrast, the
court's holding that a discovery is made when tax officials are fully
aware of the facts not only assumes that factual inquiry and legal deter-
minations are a single process but also requires a subjective inquiry into
the state of mind of tax officials.
The court's error is evident if its test is applied to differing discov-
ery situations. If a tax official finds an unlisted automobile," the facts
necessary to make a discovery as well as the legal conclusions are
usually readily apparent, and the tax official can make the factual in-
quiry and legal determination at the same time. In such a situation, even
tax officials may see the discovery as a single-step process, and the
court's test will pose little difficulty in application. However, the court's
test is inadequate in circumstances in which the discovery does not
depend on an uncovering of facts but on a determination of their legal
consequences. For example, property owned by a redevelopment com-
mission is exempt from ad valorem taxation if the property is held and
used for a public purpose.53 If it were leased to private individuals, its
exemption might be questioned, but despite their awareness of all the
facts regarding the property, responsible tax officials would probably
not list the property as discovered until a legal determination of its
exemption had been made, usually by the taxing unit's attorney. By
" 1d. §§ 105-301, -304, -305 (1972).
51d. § 105-312(d) (1972).
52Tax supervisors are provided with a list of motor vehicles registered in the supervisor's
county. Id. § 105-314 (1972).




treating a discovery as a one-step process, the court seems to have
imputed to administrators the capacity to make instant determination
of potentially complex questions of exemption and tax situs.
Factual inquiry alone can be highly complex, and cases may arise
in which raw data are known but in which, as in Strong, business ac-
counting records require audit, an analysis that may be beyond the
capacity of the examining tax official. Information from state income
and franchise tax returns provide such an audit, but these returns are
unavailable for inspection until two or three months after the board of
equalization and review has adjourned. Under these circumstances,
McLean raises the serious problem of determining when tax officials are
sufficiently aware of the facts to be held to have made a discovery. They
may have fully investigated the taxpayer's business records; neverthe-
less, if they must wait until months after the board has adjourned to
determine if there is an understatement, McLean may preclude a discov-
ery.
Only one other court has faced the issue of when an ad valorem
tax discovery occurs. In a statutory framework similar to North Caro-
lina's,54 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Noyles v. Hale55
was required to determine the time of discovery in circumstances analo-
gous to the facts in Strong. In that case, the taxpayer was an executor
who had listed the property of an estate by value rather than by item.
He under-reported, and the board of assessors listed the difference be-
tween the actual and reported values as discovered property. The tax-
payer appealed, alleging that the discovery had occurred when members
of the board of assessors became aware of the understatement before
the tax rolls were fixed. He argued that since the property was not
entered on the tax rolls until after they had been fixed, the later listing
by the board was void. Rejecting the taxpayer's contention, the court
refused to apply the test later formulated in McLean and held that the
discovery occurred when the board of assessors, as a body, listed the
property, thereby focusing its attention on the corporate act of the
board. Functionally, the corporate decision of the board in Noyles is
equivalent to the listing and sending of notice under the North Carolina
statute, for both constitute acts manifesting the time when the tax offi-
cials have determined both elements of a discovery. By limiting its
definition of "discovered" to the dictionary meaning of the word, the
34Ch. 320, § 78, [1868] Mass. Sess. L. 238.
-"137 Mass. 266 (1884).
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North Carolina court foreclosed an inquiry into the time at which a
discovery takes place as reflected in the statute.
A municipality is a taxing authority separate from the county
where it is situated56 although it is bound by statute to adopt county
valuations.57 Under statutory authority, it may establish its own listing
system or, as a convenience, it may secure its listings from the county."
Lying wholly within Winston Township, Winston-Salem had elected to
accept the county's Winston Township listings. Although Winston-
Salem relied on the county for its listings, no express provision of the
Machinery Act requires it to relinquish its independent tax powers.
However, the city's long standing use of the county listings resulted in
a virtual acquiescence to the listing actions of the county. 9
In understanding the imposition of the time limitation, it is crucial
to determine whether the court approached the action of the county in
the attempted discovery as if it were the sole taxing authority or as if it
were the "agent" of the city exercising the city's discovery power. The
court's treatment of Smith v. Town of Dunn6" indicates that it ques-
tioned the discovery power of a city where it adopts county listings. In
Smith the town board of Dunn, independently of any action by the
county, discovered and added to the town's listings property which in
the town's view had been "improperly" listed in another township of the
county. The court held that the property, although "improperly" listed
within the county, was unlisted as far as the town was concerned, and
therefore the town correctly exercised its discovery power. While this
decision might have been controlling in McLean, the court cited Smith
only as general authority that unlisted property could be construed to
include property improperly listed." The court's limitation of the hold-
ing in Smith is explained if the court tacitly distinguished Smith on the
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-326 (1972).
-1d. § 105-327 (1972).
-id. § 105-326(a) (1972).
"Not only had Winston-Salem and Forsyth County integrated their listing systems, they had
also combined their tax collection departments. Pursuant to Ch. 230, [1941] N.C. Priv. L. 229,
Winston-Salem and Forsyth County entered into a contract February 28, 1942 in which "all
County taxes shall be collected by the County-City Tax Collector and all property taxes, poll taxes,
and late listing penalties due to the City of Winston-Salem shall be likewise collected by the
County-City Tax Collector at his office to be maintained in the Forsyth County Court House"
In addition the operation of the joint office was placed under the supervision of the Forsyth County
Commissioners. Joint Tax Collection Contract Between the City of Winston-Salem and Forsyth
County, February 28, 1942.
-160 N.C. 174, 76 S.E. 242 (1912).
"1281 N.C. at 252, 188 S.E.2d at 458.
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ground that there the city, possessing its own listing system, had initi-
ated a discovery on its own. Implicit in this distinction is the assumption
by the court that Winston-Salem had given up its own listing and discov-
ery powers when it acquiesced in the county listings. Apparently the
court was not alone in making this assumption, for a principal conten-
tion of both the city and county before the court was that if the county
commissioners could not correct the listings, a city taxpayer could list
his property wherever he pleased in Forsyth County, and if the county
failed to correct the listing prior to the adjournment of the board of
equalization and review, Winston-Salem would be powerless to tax the
property."
Despite its treatment of Smith, the court recognized, at least in
principle, the independent discovery power of Winston-Salem. Since the
city as well as the county were fully aware of the facts, the court stated
in dicta that Winston-Salem was also precluded from discovery pro-
ceedings because "[t]he power conferred by G.S. 105-33 1(e) upon cities
and towns is, by the terms of that statutory provision, no more extensive
than the power conferred by that section and by G.S. 105-330 upon the
Board of County Commissioners. '"63
Through the court's failure to identify the city's part in the at-
tempted discovery, McLean may be read as limiting the discovery pow-
ers of the county commissioners. The fixing of the tax rolls by the board
of equalization and review for a given year is subject only to certain
limited alterations by the board of county commissioners. In contrast,
the statute does not provide for a time limitation on discoveries. The
policy that lies behind the freezing of the tax rolls is to prevent listed
property from being subject to a change in tax liability and to provide
stability for taxing units that must complete a tax cycle each year. The
same policy is not applicable where the property has not been subject
to tax liability at all because it was unlisted. The opinion does not offer
any explanation for the imposition of the time limitation other than that
"G.S. 105-330 makes it clear that the authority of the Board of County
Commissioners to change its listing extends no further than a change
as to property 'discovered' after the County Board of Equalization and
Review has finished its work and ceased to function. 64 Such a result is
clear only if the court, despite its general acknowledgement of the inde-
"Brief for Appellee at 10, In re McLean Trucking Co., 281 N.C. 242, 188 S.E.2d 452 (1972).
"281 N.C. at 252, 188 S.E.2d at 458.
GAId.
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pendent authority of the city, analytically lost sight of its significance
and treated the attempted discovery as an attempt by the county alone
to change the listing of McLean's property after the tax rolls had been
frozen for that year. The court apparently saw the county attempting
to effect through a discovery what the court had previously condemned
in Spiers and Wolfenden: an alteration of the tax records of previously
listed property, potentially changing its tax liability after it had already
been determined and fixed for that year by the board of equalization
and review.
If the action of the county tax authorities listing McLean's prop-
erty in Winston Township is analyzed from the standpoint of the city,
there was a true discovery, not an enlargement of county tax liability
of the kind condemned in Spiers and Wolfenden. Recognizing under
Smith that the property was unlisted as far as the city was concerned,
Winston-Salem could have initiated a discovery on its own and sepa-
rately listed the property which, for county tax purposes, would still be
listed in Broadbay Township. Since the county listing would be unaf-
fected, the policy in Spiers would be inapplicable. The only change in
the liability of the property would be the additional city taxes imposed
as a result of the city's discovery.
However, the city's long standing use of the county's listings influ-
enced the city either to overlook its statutory authority to list separately
or, more likely, to assume that the county would make discoveries for
the city since the city would appear to have no right to waive such a
necessary tax power. Having decided to treat the Winston Township
listings as listings for Winston-Salem, both the county and the city seem
to have assumed that the county was empowered, in Winston-Salem's
behalf, to exercise the city's discovery authority. Thus, there being only
one set of records (those of Winston Township), in making a discovery
as the city's agent, county officials necessarily changed the county list-
ings records, an act which the court interpreted as changing the tax
liability of already listed property, thereby invoking the prohibition in
Spiers.
But if the procedure is viewed in light of the city's interest to add
previously unlisted property to its adopted listings, the same tax conse-
quences result as if the city independently discovered the property. The
only additional liability incurred was city taxes resulting from the dis-
covery authorized by the city. At this point in its analysis, the court
seems to have lost sight of what was in substance, though not in form,
a city discovery. The county did not have any interest at stake in the
proceeding, for whether the property was listed in one township or the
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other could not effect county tax liability.
McLean imposes a difficult practical burden on tax officials, inten-
sified by the inclusion of understated property within the discovery
statute. Under McLean, tax officials are placed in a dilemma: if they
hesitate to make a discovery, awaiting, for example, a ruling on an
exemption question, the discovery might be foreclosed by the adjourn-
ment of the board of equalization and review; on the other hand, if they
list the property without awaiting a ruling, they risk initiating an unwar-
ranted discovery proceeding.
In dealing with a case in which an understatement of inventory is
suspected, a tax official seeking to minimize the impact of McLean will
probably have to list "value of unlisted inventory" as soon as he has
reasonable grounds for assuming that substantial understatement is
present. Valuation may be deferred until supporting data are available,
at which time the board of equalization and review or the board of
county commissioners can make an appraisal, perhaps after state in-
come and franchise returns have been examined. 5 Such an approach
places a premium on gamesmanship at the expense of orderly adminis-
tration. Fortunately for tax officials, they are not liable for honest errors
they make in listing. Until the result in McLean is altered by statute or
subsequent decision, ad valorem tax discovery procedures in North Car-
olina will remain in some disorder.
THOMAS S. STUKES
Constitutional Law-Changes in Party Affiliation and the Right to Vote
in the Primary
Does the Constitution allow a state to bar a qualified voter from
voting in a party primary for a period of months or even years after he
has switched his party affiliation or last participated in another party's
nominating procedures? The Supreme Court's increasing solicitude for
the right to vote and for freedom to associate for political purposes has
culminated within the last few years in the application of its new "com-
"One useful result of McLean is that it prevents supervisors from diplomatically. arbitrating
a valuation on the discovered property before it is listed. This has been a common practice not
sanctioned under the statute. Valuation occurs after the listing of the property. The tax supervisor
places a valuation on the property if it is feasible and the final valuation is set by the appropriate
board. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-312(d) (1972).
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